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Despite Parliament legislating to avoid a No Deal Brexit next month, 
Prime Minister Johnson has said he would rather ‘die in a ditch’ than 
write a letter asking for another extension to Article 50. There remains 
considerable uncertainty about when and how the UK will leave the 
EU, and whether with a deal or not. 
The possible impacts of No Deal have been set out in the recently 
released summary of Operation Yellowhammer, which corresponds 
with detailed analysis undertaken by the UK in a Changing Europe 
programme in its recent No Deal Brexit report. 
That report stresses that No Deal will not “get Brexit done”; rather it 
will usher in a period of prolonged uncertainty for citizens, workers 
and businesses, and one which is unlikely to be resolved anytime 
soon. 
In terms of goods and manufacturing, the immediate impact of No 
Deal would be felt keenly by manufacturing sectors which operate 
fine-grained ‘just-in-time’ (JIT) production, operations and logistics 
systems across Europe. 
Think of aerospace firms such as Airbus, major automobile 
assemblers such as Nissan, Toyota, Honda, Jaguar Land Rover, 
BMW, Vauxhall and Ford (in the latter case engines), and automotive 
component suppliers such as GKN. 
Honda itself warned at a Business Select Committee hearing last year 
that a No Deal Brexit poses big risks for the firm’s Swindon operations 
in terms of tariffs, customs delays and bureaucracy pushing up 
costs.  When considering the impact of No Deal on manufacturing, we 
might also think of the impact on skills, regulation, and R&D. 
The operations of many manufacturing firms run on short delivery and 
production schedules with inventory levels often kept at just a few 
hours so as to ensure low cost and high efficiency. 
For firms like these, just-in-time systems underpin the whole logic of 
their activities, and they will face major challenges adjusting to the 
delays and uncertainty of customs and border checks in the event of 
No Deal. 
While manufacturers undertook frantic stock-building in the run up to 
the original end-of-March deadline to mitigate some of these risks, 
there is a limit as to how far this can go as holding high levels of 
stocks undermines the very efficiency and quality of production and 
delivery systems. 
In addition, rapid and widespread switching to local UK suppliers isn’t 
possible as so much of the value-added in sectors such as automotive 
is already imported (something like 60% of the components going into 
a UK assembled car are on average imported, mainly from the EU). 
The UK’s supply base simply isn’t geared up to supply many of these 
components. ‘Reshoring’ component supplies is a long term business 
needing a dedicated industrial policy to back it up. That in turn 
requires some major policy developments. 
Essentially, customs delays under a No-Deal Brexit would throw a big 
spanner in the works of JIT systems commonly used across UK and 
EU manufacturing. 
Take the example of Honda: in evidence to the Business Select 
Committee, Honda said that it retained just an hour’s worth of parts at 
the Swindon production line, and it required 350 trucks’ worth of 
components to be delivered every day from Europe. 
Honda stated that every 15 minutes of customs delay would cost it up 
to £850,000 a year, and that it would take the firm 18 months to set up 
new procedures and warehouses if Britain left the Customs Union. 
Even then, with 2 million daily component movements, just minor 
delays at the Channel Tunnel and Dover would force hundreds of its 
trucks to wait for hours. 
Honda’s government affairs manager stated that “outside of the 
customs union, there is no such thing as a frictionless border. I 
wouldn’t say that the just-in-time manufacturing model wouldn’t work, 
but it would certainly be very challenging.” 
In short, No Deal is likely to mean short term disruption in the sector 
as firms run out of components after a few days. Stop-start production 
is likely, with rising costs and a hit to efficiency and profits. 
There are similar issues in aerospace: for example, UK aerospace 
exports are highly dependent on participation in the EU supply chain, 
since the sector is highly specialised in a few key areas. 
The bulk of exports are of parts (wings, fuselage, landing gear and 
engines) rather than whole aircraft. The OECD estimates that around 
40 per cent of the value-added in UK aerospace gross exports 
originates abroad. 
European aerospace supply chains compete in large part on speed as 
well as production cost. Airbus for example, has stressed to the 
House of Commons Business Committee that customs delays would 
be a “critically bad” issue for them.[1] 
Another major issue in the event of No Deal would be tariff barriers for 
some manufacturing sectors; for example this would push up import 
and export prices of cars, and impact on exports and hence 
production in the UK. 
The short run production hit arising in this way from No Deal has been 
estimated at around 175,000 cars a year (that’s not including the 
Honda closure), which is over 10% of UK car output.[2] 
Longer term, there is a significant risk that some firms would consider 
shifting production activities outside of the UK. Honda and Ford have 
already announced plants closures in the UK for a variety of reasons; 
Brexit uncertainty being seen by many as one factor. 
Other assemblers may follow in the event of a No Deal, especially 
when new model production is being planned. Peugeot has already 
stated bluntly that No Deal would mean no investment at Vauxhall at 
Ellesmere Port (the current Astra model is due to be replaced in 
2021). 
Carlos Tavares, the Chief Executive of PSA Group, which owns 
Vauxhall, said recently that “No Deal cannot be considered. This 
would be very bad for the UK, very bad for Europe, very bad for all of 
us.” 
It’s worth noting that there is plenty of spare capacity in the European 
auto industry. Other countries would jump at the chance to attract 
such assembly activity, hoping that that they could also pull in 
significant (especially higher value) parts of the value chain. In that 
sense the employment effects of losing assembly operations could be 
significantly higher than the jobs just associated with the big 
assemblers. 
So longer term the effects of No Deal could be worse than the short 
term hit as investment in new models in the UK may be lost. If 
decisions on where to build new models go against the UK under a 
No Deal scenario then annual UK auto production could be over 
500,000 units lower in the second half of the next decade than under 
a managed, orderly Brexit Deal.[3] 
The shock to the auto industry of No Deal would have negative 
impacts on UK automotive and manufacturing, including its suppliers, 
workers and the places hosting such activity. Policy responses would 
need to draw on earlier experience in trying to cushion the blow – 
such as the Rover Task force and the Automotive Response 
Programme in the Midlands in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. 
A range of measures to anticipate and respond to shocks would be 
needed. Given that the production hit would cascade down the 
supply-chain, business support would need to include help for 
otherwise viable firms through measures such as loan funds, 
temporary wage subsidies, diversification advice, and tax and rate 
relief. Workers would need support in terms of training and retraining. 
Places affected would need measures to remediate sites, improve 
connectivity and regenerate places, in turn raising questions over the 
degree of devolved powers to achieve this. While No Deal 
preparations are under way, it is not clear that government is 
prepared for such wide-ranging policy interventions to deal with such 
shocks. 
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